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1. Introduction
This is a background paper, provided to the Commission on Development Related
Research in Denmark. Its purpose is to inform the Commission about current thinking
relevant to the funding of research for development. Our approach is to consider theory
and policy from a global perspective, and to derive conclusions for development
funding, rather than to consider developing country research in isolation. 
Research funding is a potentially important component of development aid because of
the central role played by technological change – in the wide sense of the improvement
and use of knowledge in production – in socio-economic development. ‘Research’ in
this sense is to be construed widely, not as ‘basic research’ – whose relevance in isolation
to development processes is minimal. In this paper, we will use ‘R&D’ as a short hand
for this wide definition – though we will also show that the required concept is wider
even than conventionally defined R&D. 
Nations need to devote some of their income to R&D in order to put externally-
generated improvements in knowledge to use, be competitive, make good policy and
strategy decisions, especially as the technological content of governmental decisions
increases. 
R&D has two ‘faces’ – a knowledge generating face, and a learning or knowledge using
face. The knowledge-using face is quantitatively more important in developed than in
developing countries, because it deals with the huge stock of knowledge that is exploited
in productive activity. The knowledge-generating face is qualitatively important because
it provides additions to that stock. Technology-using organisations including farms,
healthcare institutions and industrial firms need R&D to help acquire and absorb the
existing stock, as well as occasionally to make additions to it. Governments increasingly
need R&D to enable them to regulate the acquisition and absorption of technology and
in order to improve their own activities. For example, issues such as regulating the use
of genetically modified crops and the environmental implications of changes in
agriculture require considerable technological sophistication. Government, too, is the
chief provider of people and knowledge to society through the higher education and
research system. It is much more important in this respect than as a provider of new
technologies. Under certain circumstances, it makes sense to use government R&D to
develop completely new knowledge – ‘research’ in the traditional sense – but this is by
no means always a high priority. 
Companies in capitalist economies, at all levels of development, under-invest in
knowledge production. The state usually tries to compensate for this, by making long-
term investments, which should yield social benefits (externalities). Donors can support
this by providing resources, which can be invested away from short-term budgetary
pressures but under the strategic control of the recipients. The object of such donations
must be to support the performance of R&D and innovative activities and the creation
of knowledge infrastructures to support the economic and social structures and
problems of particular recipient nations. While local knowledges must exist to tackle
specific problems, most of the knowledge required is globally generated and globally
valid. The required knowledge is ‘world class.’ Just as ‘appropriate technology’ tends to
be uncompetitive, so bad science is not science at all. But the required knowledge
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mostly does not reside within public research institutions. Rather, it needs to exist right
across the economy and society – in firms, on farms and in hospitals as much as in the
universities. 
In this paper, we first discuss a number of important new ideas about research, technology
and development. We place these in the wider context of national systems of innovation
and production, and consider lessons – particularly from the way the ‘Tiger’ Newly
Industrialising Countries in SE Asia have developed – for knowledge management. We
contrast these with the development of research capacities and the role of donors in less
developed countries before arriving at conclusions about new requirements for donor
policies concerning research for development. 
If desired, section 5.2 can be read as a summary of this paper. 
2. Some New Ideas about Research, Technology and Development
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2. Some New Ideas about Research,
Technology and Development
Important elements of the ‘mental model’ with which Western policy makers have
approached research and economic development policy since the Second World War
have been shaped by a number of ideas which we now see as misconceived. These ideas
have promoted the design and deployment of counter-productive policies, both in the
context of funding research for development and in research policy more generally. Such
misleading ideas include:
• The idea that invention, rather than imitation, is the major source of innovation and
economic development. In fact, ‘creative imitation’ and exploitation of the existing
stock of knowledge accounts for most economic development 
• The idea that basic science is the ultimate source of innovation and therefore of
economic development (the so-called ‘linear model’ of innovation). In fact, the
relation between basic science and the innovation process as a whole most resembles
the ‘parallel play’ of two-year-olds. From the perspective of economic innovation,
science is generally more interesting as a source of trained people than as a source of
new and commercially relevant knowledge
• The neo-classical model of the firm as a well-informed, rational robot. Real firms are
fallible, have variable capabilities, lack information and make progress through
learning
• Market failure as the only (or chief ) justification for state (and, therefore, donor)
intervention in research. The new understanding of real firms suggests a broader role
for the state in enabling companies, farms and other technology-using institutions to
function well.
In this section, we describe the transition in thinking in each of these areas, as a basis
for defining better donor policy for funding research for development. 
2.1 Creative Imitation and the Dynamics of Capitalist Development
The role of technological change as a driving force in capitalist economic development
has for a long time been understood. Adam Smith wrote1 of improvements in production
and the division of labour being driven by “philosophers or men of speculation whose
trade it is not to do anything but to observe everything; and who, upon that account,
are often capable of combining together the powers of the most distant and dissimilar
objects.” Marx placed the transformation of social relations and of technology at the
centre of his analysis of capitalism, while Schumpeter connected technology with the
“gale of creative destruction” that drove capitalist progress. 
While economists have awarded the central role in economic development to
technological progress, they mean something rather broader than hardware and
software: namely ‘a new combination of the factors of production.’ This may involve
using results of scientific or technological research. However, it can also involve much
1) Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations, 1776; reprinted, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1974, p. 115.
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more mundane things such as laying out the machines on the factory floor in a better
order, changing the design of the product packaging or copying ideas from a producer
in a distant market in order to create a local advantage. These things may be ‘new to the
firm’ as opposed to ‘new to the world,’ yet still give rise to competitive advantage. A key
observation, however, is that innovation is a fundamentally economic process, in which
technology may play a greater or a lesser role. 
The reason economists see technical change as being such an important driver of
economic development is that it involves imitation. By creating a temporary advantage, an
innovator forces competitors to react – often in creative ways involving improvements
and ‘innovating around’ the first innovator’s design, rather than through simple copying.
In this way, innovations give rise to changes in the economy, which may be several
times larger than the effect on the original innovator. 
Exhibit 1 shows the conventional representation of the effects of successful innovation
on the entrepreneur’s profit rate. Initially, profits drop below the industry norm, as the
entrepreneur pays the investment costs of innovation. Success of the innovation allows
the entrepreneur to earn super-normal profits for a period when she effectively
monopolises the innovation. These profits are then competed away by the innovative
and imitative activities of other entrepreneurs. Often, these competitors use much of the
same knowledge stock as the original innovator.2
Exhibit 1
Innovation and Profits
In is often only in this kind of simple theoretical exposition that a difference between
original and imitative innovation is clear. A normal pattern is for an industry to
experience a continuous sequence of innovations – as in the succession of models
offered by competitors in the car industry. Whether we describe these as innovations or
– recognising their common but developing knowledge base – creative imitations
matters only in so far as ‘imitation’ has a bad press. 
Profit Rate
Time
Forgone Profits
Super-normal Profits
'Normal' profit in the industry
Innovtor's profit rate
2) R Brainard, C Leedman and J Lumbers, Science and Technology Policy Outlook, Paris: 
OECD, 1988.
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If we go on to consider where the ‘original’ innovator obtained the knowledge used, most
of that will also come from the existing stock. In so far, then, as every innovation is based
on a lot of existing knowledge mixed in with a little new thinking, the distinction between
innovation and imitation in economic terms breaks down. All innovation is in this sense
imitation. There are, of course, differences in the degree of novelty involved and the
extent to which innovations can be appropriated. The terminology of ‘innovation’ contra
‘imitation’ with its connotation of ‘superior’ contra ‘inferior’ serves the interests of those
who do research to create new knowledge by enabling them to claim high status. But,
in terms of economics and development, its connotations are inaccurate and counter-
productive. Imitation is perhaps the central fact about innovation and economic
development under capitalism.
2.2 New Models of Innovation
The mental models we carry around with us shape the way policy is made. In relation
to innovation, the predominant popular mental model – the so-called ‘linear model’ –
suggests that basic science leads to applied science, which causes innovation and wealth.
This ‘technology push’ or ‘science push’ idea is mistaken. Policies based on this model
tend therefore to be counter-productive. 
For most of historical time, no one worried much about a distinction between basic
science and technology. Theory-building and technological development went along in
parallel: sometimes apart; sometimes together. Indeed, the early Industrial Revolution in
England had little to do with formal science and a great deal to do with practical
experimentation and work by ‘mechanics’ in a pattern of imitation and incremental
improvement. An often-quoted example of the relationship in practice is the impetus
given to thermodynamics in the Nineteenth Century by the development of the steam
engine. Over time, theoretical developments first began to explain why steam engines
worked and only later to provide a basis for improving their design. 
The startling achievements of physics during the Second World War had made clear the
immense power of science, reinforcing belief in science as a force for social change. The
manifesto for the new view of science was Vannevar Bush’s 1945 report3 Science: The
Endless Frontier, which successfully argued the case for a US National Science Foundation
and paved the way for the massive expansion of higher education and research since the
war. Bush had spent the war doing a mixture of applied and use-inspired research to
underpin weapons development. Yet his manifesto for post-war science was basic science
and he argued that increasing science funding would automatically increase product and
process innovation and therefore national competitiveness as well as military
preparedness. It seems odd to those of us who have lived with the term all our lives, but
the idea of ‘basic research’ is therefore rather new and rather artificial – “a rhetorical
creation on the part of scientists anxious to justify their social position.”4 The high
(almost religious)5 status, which the basic science establishment has managed to achieve
has made it hard to question the allocation of resources to it. 
3) Science The Endless Frontier, A Report to the President by Vannevar Bush, Director of the Office of
Scientific Research and Development, Washington DC: United States Government Printing Office,
July 1945.
4) Ibid.
5) Paul Feyerabend, Against Method, London: NLB, 1975.
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The 1950s and 1960s saw significant efforts in many OECD countries to build up their
university systems and, often, dedicated research institutions. There were many reasons
for this, including an increasingly democratic view of education as well as a belief that
this growth would hasten economic reconstruction and development. But in economic
terms, underlying these efforts was the now-traditional ‘linear’ view of the innovation
process as being essentially ‘pushed’ by science. The policy implication of the linear
model is simple: if you want more innovation (and therefore economic development),
you fund more science. 
With hindsight, we can see how easy it was to take the scientific achievements of the
War out of context. In fact, they made a huge impact for at least two reasons:
• First, the now-famous projects like Manhattan Project, which developed the atomic
bomb, often responded to clear military requirements (powerful munitions, detection
of enemy aircraft); in other words, they were in a strong sense user-oriented 
• Second, they did not happen in the context of peacetime markets but in wartime –
that is, in command economies, where it is possible to force a direct connection
between technological advance and economic production. 
During the 1950s, the science-push model of innovation dominated.6 While there was
some limited research support for this view in the 1950s, in its crude form it does not
stand up to much scientific scrutiny. It is perhaps better thought of as part of the
ideological superstructure of the post War expansion of science, rather than as a theory of
innovation. Soon, thanks to the empirical work of those such as Carter and Williams,7
Schmookler8 and Myers and Marquis,9 more emphasis came to be placed on the role of
the marketplace in innovation. This led to market-pull or need-pull models of the
innovation process. Exhibit 2 is a schematic of the two linear models. 
Exhibit 2
Traditional (Linear) Models of Innovation
Science Push
Market Pull
SalesMarketingManufact-
uring
EngineeringBasic
Science
Market
Needs
Manufact-
uring
SalesDevelopment
6) This account of successive generations of innovation model is partly based on Roy Rothwell, ‘Successful
Industrial Innovation: Critical Factors for the 1990s’, R&D Management,: 3, p. 221-239, 1992.
7) Carter, C. and Williams, B., Industry and Technical Progress, Oxford University Press, 1957.
8) Schmookler, J., Invention and economic growth, Harvard University press, 1966.
9) Myers, S. and Marquis, D.G., Successful Industrial Innovation, National Science Foundation, 1969.
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A key weakness of the linear models is a failure to conceptualise how the links between
successive stages of innovation are supposed to work. Such links are, in fact, very
difficult to achieve in a managed way, except inside a single company. Typically,
different people do the activities conducted at each stage in different places and often in
different institutions. They tend to have different motivations and incentives and to
operate in different interpersonal networks. A priori, one would expect it to be very
hard to create the kind of chain-links between them, which are depicted in the linear
models. 
By the late 1970s, Mowery and Rosenberg10 largely laid the intellectual argument
between push and pull to rest by stressing the importance of coupling between science,
technology and the marketplace. Their coupling model constituted a more or less
sequential process linking science with the marketplace (via engineering, technological
development, manufacturing, marketing and sales), but with the addition of a number
of feed-back loops and variations over time in the primacy of ‘push’ and ‘pull’
mechanisms. This is shown schematically in Exhibit 3.
Exhibit 3
Modern ‘Coupling’ Model of Innovation
The preoccupation of the earlier generations of innovation model is with the link
between the flow of new knowledge and economic innovation. However, this ignores the
huge importance of the stock of existing knowledge indicated at the bottom of Exhibit 3.
The vast majority of the knowledge used in any innovation comes out of this stock, and
is not created afresh in the project that gives rise to the innovation. Important parts of
the knowledge stock can be very old, as was shown in the TRACES and HINDSIGHT11
projects, which tracked the movement of knowledge elements respectively from applied
and basic research into industrial practice across very long periods of time. 
Needs of society and the market place
State of the art in tehnology and production 
Underlying stock of existing knowlegde
Prototype
Production
Manufact-
uring
Marketing
and Sales
Development
New 
Idea
New 
Technology
Idea
Generation
Market
Place
10) Mowery, D.C. and Rosenberg, N., ‘The Influence of Market Demand upon Innovation: A Critical
Review of Some Recent Empirical Studies’, Research Policy, April 1978.
11) Illinois Institute of Technology, 1969, Technology in Retrospect and Critical Events in Science
(TRACES: A report to the National Science Foundation), NSF Contract C535; Office of the
Director of Defense Research and Engineering, Project Hindsight – Final Report, National Technical
Information Service, 1967.
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Working with and reworking the stock of knowledge is the dominant activity in
innovation – a fact which is readily obscured by the focus on novelty in the linear models
and in the values of the research (as opposed to the R&D) community. Countless
surveys of OECD firms show that their main sources of technology are internal
knowledge and other firms. Public sector research accounts for a vanishingly small share
of their knowledge inputs. In product development, considerable efforts are devoted to
monitoring competitors’ products and to reverse engineering – both as a source of ideas
and in order to benchmark the company’s own processes. For example, car companies
routinely buy each others’ new models and disassemble them. We are aware of at least
one case in the USA where the same was done with a railway locomotive. 
Innovation theory has moved on to consider increasingly complex ‘systems’ refinements
of Mowery and Rosenberg’s model. However, the simple linear model retains a strong
grasp on the popular and political imagination, and continues therefore to be an
important driver of policy and practice. Its empirical credentials may be dubious, but it
helps justify the position of the scientific élite. At least as bad, by diverting attention
from the fact that most R&D involves working with existing knowledge it obscures the
central role of creative imitation in OECD practice. 
2.3 Reconceptualising the Firm
The past twenty or so years have seen a radical re-thinking in innovation theory about
the firm, improving significantly our understanding. Conventional, neo-classical
economics viewed firms, in effect, as autonomous and rational robots using perfect
information. Much of the traditional, neo-classical framework has been overturned
during the 1990s, through a convergence of evolutionary economics, with its stress on
firms as ‘learning organisations,’ and research on the innovation process. The new
National Innovation Systems12 approach stresses the idea that firms and other economic
actors have ‘bounded rationality’ and this makes knowledge, learning and institutions
key to overall economic performance. In the new view, economic actors are no longer
autonomous robots, but are deeply interwoven into the economic fabric. The
performance of the individual firm or institution and the system as a whole are inter-
related. The unit of analysis is no longer only the individual firm but also the ‘system’ of
networks within which firms operate. National economic performance is explained as
the performance of this total system. 
A second key idea, which stems from the central role attributed to learning, is that of
historical path dependence. What a company or institution can do today depends upon
what it could do yesterday13 and what it has learnt in the meantime. “Often, the
elements of the system of innovation either reinforce each other in promoting processes
of learning and innovation or, conversely, combine into blocking such processes. 
12) See Christopher Freeman, Technology Policy and Economic Performance: Lessons from Japan,
London: Frances Pinter, 1987; Bengt-Åke Lundvall, National Systems of Innovation: Towards a
Theory of Innovation and Interactive Learning, London: Pinter, 1992; RR Nelson, National
Innovation Systems, New York: Oxford University Press, 1993.
13) Nathan Rosenberg, Perspectives on Technology, Cambridge University Press, 1976.
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Cumulative causation, and virtuous and vicious circles, are characteristics of systems and
sub-systems of innovation.”14
2.4 Market Failure
The new view of firms, and therefore of markets, leads to new and different rationales
for government policy and for funder activity. 
The idea of ‘market failure’ leading to under-investment in research has been the
principal rationale for state funding of R&D15 in the post-War period. Of course,
governments had been funding research long before the economics profession produced
a reason. Arrow is generally credited with describing the three major sources of market
failure which – from a neo-classical perspective – make it useful for government to fund
research:
• Indivisibility, because of the existence of minimum efficient scale
• Inappropriability of the profit stream from research, leading to a divergence between
public and private returns on investment. This results from two essential (and
economically efficient) freedoms that scientific researchers have: namely to publish
and to change jobs
• Uncertainty, namely divergences in the riskiness of research respectively for private
and public actors.
Arrow’s argument was particularly relevant to more ‘basic’ (and, by implication, generally
applicable) forms of knowledge because capitalists’ inability to monopolise the results of
such research meant they would be least likely to invest in it. His argument is, however,
conceptually flawed. It simply assumes that there is under-investment in basic research
compared to an imagined welfare-economic optimum. It makes this assumption because
it implicitly accepts the ‘linear model’ account of the role of science in economics and
development. In fact, no one has observed or calculated what such an optimum would
look like. 
Relying on the neo-classical model of the firm, the market failure approach assumes
away key deficiencies of real companies, not least what we have elsewhere called
‘capability failures.16’ The new approach to the firm suggests that there are other
important failures affecting economic performance. These include failures in
infrastructural provision and investment; ‘transition failures’; lock-in failures; and
institutional failures.17 These failures justify state intervention not only through the
14) Bengt Åke Lundvall (ed), National Systems of Innovation: Towards a Theory of Innovation and
Interactive Learning, London: Pinter, 1992.
15) Ken Arrow, ‘Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention,’ in Richard Nelson (Ed.)
The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity, Princeton University Press, 1962; see also Richard
Nelson, ‘The simple economics of basic scientific research,’ Journal of Political Economy, 1959, vol
67, pp. 297-306.
16) Erik Arnold and Ken Guy, ‘Diffusion policies for IT: the way forward,’ OECD/ICCP Expert group
on the economic implications of Information Technologies, Paris: OECD, 1991.
17) see Keith Smith, Systems Approaches to Innovation: Some Policy Issues, TSER 3.1.1, Oslo: STEP
Group 1996.
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funding of basic science, but more widely in ensuring that the Innovation System
performs as a whole. 
While this makes a huge difference in theory, it involves less of a change in the practice
of OECD and many NIC governments, which have long assumed wide responsibilities
in education, developing infrastructures, assisting companies in developing capabilities
and so on. Their practice is in stark contrast to many recommendations and
requirements of the World Bank, through which they forbid to developing countries the
policy mechanisms they use at home. If the new view of the firm is correct, then donor
and lender willingness to promote the use of these more active forms of intervention is
key to effective development. 
3. Innovation Systems
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3. Innovation Systems – A Radically Changed
View of Knowledge and Production
Over the past ten years or so, there has been a revolution – a ‘paradigm shift’ – in the
way we understand the relationship between research, innovation and socio-economic
development. In a number of areas, policy practice had moved ahead of theory, but
theoretical development means that we now have in some countries greater harmony
between theory and practice than was the case in 1990. 
3.1 National Innovation Systems
As one would expect with such a new concept, a precise definition of a ‘National
Innovation System’ is still emerging. Nelson and Rosenberg18 use a rather narrow
definition, namely the “set of institutions whose interaction determine the innovative
performance of national firms.” Metcalfe says: 
A system of innovation is that set of distinct institutions which jointly and individually
contributes to the development and diffusion of new technologies and which provides the
framework within which governments form and implement policies to influence the
innovation process. As such it is a system of interconnected institutions to create, store and
transfer the knowledge, skills and artefacts which define new technologies.19
Based on what the NIS literature actually says about the way innovations happen, we
prefer an inclusive definition. Exhibit 4 sketches what we mean by a ‘National Innovation
System’: namely, all the actors and activities in the economy which are necessary for
industrial and commercial innovation to take place and to lead to economic development.
As we indicated earlier, those who do research on research and innovation have given up
attempts to understand successful innovation through single-factor explanations (such as
technology push or demand pull) as inconsistent with the data. Instead, the current
orthodoxy is that economic well-being is founded on a well-functioning National
Innovation System, in which not only the actors shown in Exhibit 4, but also the links
between them, perform well. The NIS is in this sense similar to Lall’s notion of national
technological capability:
National technological capability is the complex of skills, experience, and effort that enables a
country’s enterprises to efficiently buy, use, adapt, improve and create technologies. While the
individual enterprise remains the fundamental unit of technological activity, national
capability is more than the sum of individual firm capabilities. It comprises the non-market
network of inter-firm networking and linkages, ways of doing business, and the web of
supporting institutions. 
18) R R Nelson and N Rosenberg, ‘Technical innovations and national systems,’ in R R Nelson (ed),
National Innovation Systems: A Comparative Analysis, Oxford Univerisity Press, 1983.
19) Metcalfe, J., The Economic Foundations of Technology Policy: Equilibrium and Evolutionary
Perspectives; Stoneman, P., (ed.) Handbook of the Economics of Innovation and Technology Change,
Oxford: Blackwell.
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These affect significantly how firms interact with each other and the efficacy with which they
exchange the information needed to co-ordinate their activities and to benefit from collective
learning.20
Exhibit 4
Major Components of a National Innovation System
Education and
Research System
• Professional education 
   and training
• Higher education 
   and research
• Public setor research
Business 
System
• Companiess
• Farms
• Health care, ect.
Infrastructure 
• Banking, venture capital
• IPR and information system
• Innovation and business support system
• Standards and norms
Intermediate 
Organisations
• Research Institutes
• Brokers, ect.
Framework Conditions
• Financial environment
• Taxation and incentives
• Propensity to innovation and entrepreneurship
• Trust
• Mobility
• Education, literacy
Demand      
• Consumers (final demand)  • Producers (intermediate demand)
20) Sanjaya Lall, ‘Technological change and industrialisation in the Asian newly industrialising
economies: achievements and challenges,’ in Linsu Kim and Richard R Nelson (eds.) Technology,
Learning and Innovation: Experiences of Newly Industrialising Economies, Cambridge University
Press, 2000.
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In contrast to earlier views focusing on entrepreneurs as individual heroes, innovation
and learning are now seen more as network activities. 
As Edqvist argues21 “the notion of optimality is absent from the systems of innovation
approaches. Hence comparisons between an existing system and an ideal system are not
possible.” The NIS approach is nonetheless normative, in the sense that it claims that
certain system characteristics – such as strong network links between actors – are likely
to improve performance.22
3.2 The Business System
The ‘business system’23 shown in Exhibit 4 is of particular importance. This is where
knowledge is translated into goods and services, so it is where wealth is created.
Companies are therefore among the most important institutions in this sector – and
increasingly so as levels of development rise. Almost all the knowledge (technology)
used in this system is generated within it. For example, the commonest sources of a
company’s technology are its own stock of knowledge or another company. To the extent
that innovation happens in networks, these are very often supply-chain networks. At
this level, the direct contribution of the R&D infrastructure to economic development
is small. That infrastructure plays a much greater role in providing trained manpower,
learning and service provision than in new creating knowledge, which is applied directly
in innovations. 
Because of bounded rationality, the notion of ‘absorptive capacity’ is also key to our
understanding of learning and the development process. Crudely, it says that the ability
of companies to learn depends on their internal capabilities, and that these capabilities
can often be represented by the number and level of scientifically and technologically
qualified staff in an organisation. Callon points out24 that substantial absorptive
capacity is needed, in the form of complementary skills and investments, to make use of
much ‘public’ science. He questions the claim that such results are ‘public goods’ in any
meaningful sense. 
Altering the balance of R&D (and, more generally, innovation) expenditure and effort
between the business system and the state is one of the key phenomena in economic
development. In most OECD countries, the great majority of R&D is financed and
performed within the business25 sector. We now understand that R&D has two ‘faces’:
21) Charles Edqvist (ed), Systems of Innovation, London: Frances Pinter, 1997.
22) Rodrigo Arocena and Judith Stutz, ‘Looking at national systems of innovation from the South,’
Industry and Innovation, Vol 7, No 1, June 2000, pp. 55-75.
23) This term is slightly unusual. We use it to indicate that, while a major component is companies,
other organisations, such as farms and hospitals, which create and use technology in the production
of goods and services need to be included. In developing countries, the agriculturale component tends
to be high, while in OECD countries this system is dominated by industrial companies.
24) Michel Callon, ‘Is Science a Public Good?’ Science, Technology and Human Values, Vol 19, 
pp. 395-424.
25) Given the important proviso that state-owned companies are well managed and run on quasi-
private lines, it need not matter for this purpose whether parts of the company sector are owned by 
the state.
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The learning face, which acquires and absorbs technology; and the innovative face, which
seeks and applies new knowledge.26 This means that the company sector is securing the
bulk of its technological needs through its own efforts and that it is doing enough R&D
to be economically dynamic. It has the ‘absorptive capacity’27 to conduct a professional
dialogue with the state research sector and other external sources of knowledge. It is, in
many cases, working close enough to the technological frontier that it needs to turn to
such external sources, as opposed to adopting and adapting existing technologies. 
This situation contrasts sharply with that in many developing countries, where the
company sector’s investment in R&D is extremely low. In most cases, it is massively
overshadowed by the small amount of resources the state devotes to research. A ratio of
80:20 between government and business expenditure on R&D is common in
developing countries. In stark contrast, among OECD countries R&D expenditure and
performance are dominated by the business system, which performs 60-70 per cent of
national R&D. Where its own expenditure on R&D and innovative activities is low, the
business system is often unable to make use of results from the research sector and
elsewhere – notably other companies’ stock of knowledge – and may have difficulty
even in absorbing research-trained manpower. Crucially, it may be unable to specify its
research and technology needs, and it can therefore be difficult to involve it in the
governance of research – a device used extensively in OECD countries28 to ensure the
economic relevance of state funding of research and research-trained manpower. 
With the replacement in theory of the neo-classical robot by a more realistic view of the
firm as having bounded rationality – and therefore limited abilities to learn and adapt –
it becomes obvious that companies’ technological capabilities are major determinants of
performance. 
Technological capabilities can also be considered as belonging to two separate (but often
complementary) types. 
Some elements of the knowledge system tend to be more concerned with using, replicating and
re-circulating knowledge that is already established within the production system, whereas
other elements are more involved in acquiring, creating, processing and accumulating new
knowledge, so that it can be brought into play in the system. The knowledge-using elements
are involved, for example, in maintaining or expanding capacity using given modes of
production; training workers in established operating procedures, or within a cluster context,
the imitation of the production techniques used by neighbouring firms. The knowledge-
changing elements are involved, for example, in the management of innovation processes; in
product design and development; or in the search for, selection, adaptation and assimilation
of new product or process technology.29
26) W Cohen and D Levinthal, ‘Innovation and learning; the two faces of R&D,’ Economic Journal,
Vol 99, 1989, pp. 569-596.
27) W Cohen and D Levinthal, ‘Absorptive capacity: a new perspective on learning and innovation,’
Administrative Science Quarterly, No 35, 1990, pp. 128-152.
28) For example, even in the very small countries of Norway and Sweden, the main technology-funding
agencies (respectively, RCN and NUTEK) each boast external networks of 1000-1100 people drawn
from industry and academia, who play active roles in defining and steering R&D programmes.
29) Martin Bell and Michael Albu, ‘Knowledge systems and technological dynamism in industrial
clusters in developing countries,’ World Development, No 9, 1999, pp. 1715-1734.
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The meanings of ‘technological capability’ are not yet well mapped. Exhibit 5 is a non-
exhaustive list of what the concept includes, in relation to companies. We would expect
the needs of others in the business system – farms, hospitals and so forth – to be
broadly similar. OECD countries and the more successful NICs tend to devote
significant state resources to fostering these capabilities, which form the needed
foundation for technological dynamism, R&D performance and success in the company
sector. In the absence of significant technological capability in that sector, state R&D
expenditures bring few economic benefits.30 
Exhibit 5
Company Technological Capabilities 
Source: Erik Arnold and Ben Thuriaux, Developing Firms’ Technological Capabilities, report to OECD,
Brighton: Technopolis, 1997
OECD countries have a huge repertoire of state extension, education and other
programmes aimed at improving these technological capabilities. 
Strategic      
• Search for market opportunities
Networking Capabilities 
Access external knowledge
• Science
• Technology, techniques
• Artifacts, practices
• Know-how, tacit knowledge
• Information resources
Manage producer/user relations
Access partners with needed
complementary assets 
• Complementary knowledge
• Complementary production 
• Complementary supply-chain role
Internal 
Tangible technology 
• Products
• R&D facilities
• Appropriate plant and equipment
Develop and manage appropriate 
intangible resources
• Codified intellectual capital
• Qualification and skills profile 
 adapted to the needs of the firm
• Tacit knowledge
Create needed organisation
• Technology management capabilities
• Change-management capabilities
• Coordination among internal ‘owners’ 
 of capabilities
• Understand and manage the fit between
   the firm’s capabilities and market needs
30) An important reservation here is the agricultural sector, where geography-specific and local-
adaptation R&D in state institutions can bring important benefits – provided they are accompanied
by an extension service or other mechanism which actively transfers results to farmers.
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3.3 Demand and Framework Conditions
In addition to the company sector, the state is in most countries an important
‘customer’ for research. The quality and quantity of the state’s demand for R&D can be
an important factor shaping the quality and overall relevance of the research sector. On
the one hand, the state can over-demand research in particular areas, skewing national
research capabilities into directions which have limited socio-economic value. A
conspicuous example is the extreme importance of ‘defence’ R&D in the USA, UK and
France, which appears31 to have had a negative influence on economic performance. On
the other hand, the state can under-demand R&D support, owing to inadequate
understanding of its usefulness, or to lack of appropriate mechanisms – such as an
absence of research budgets in ministries. 
A further important side-side influence on the innovation system is the sophistication of
consumers’ and companies’ demand. The more demanding customers are of high
quality and performance standards, the more strongly motivated is national industry to
meet these standards. In the absence of an exacting demand side, the national market
affords at least temporary shelter from global norms, reducing the incentive for
companies to perform to international levels. 
Other ‘framework’ conditions are important in shaping the performance of national
innovation systems. Obviously, fiscal and taxation policies are important, but so too are
levels of trust (and the absence of corruption) in business dealings, levels of education
and literacy, and the national propensity to entrepreneurship. Several of these factors are
closely linked to culture. All can be influenced by appropriate policies. 
3.4 The Research Sector
As regards the research sector, performance standards are set by global science, just as in
the business system quality standards are set in international competition. In so far as
research communities are international, this means that researchers must be capable of
publishing internationally, training and examining PhDs at a standard which is
internationally recognised and otherwise be members of the global ‘invisible colleges’32
or networks which define the scientific community. 
The type of research community that is needed differs at different stages of development.
There is clear consensus among the OECD countries that a basic science component is
important in advanced industrial economies, even if there is a degree of variation among
them in the relative allocation of resources between basic and other types of research.
Kim and others33 argue – in our view convincingly – that the pattern of research needs
to be smaller-scale and much more applied at ‘earlier’ development stages. 
The role of ‘intermediate institutions’ such as applied research institutes and research
associations is frequently under-estimated or misunderstood. These typically have low
status compared with universities and basic science institutes. They perform applied
R&D and technical support activities, which are in principle relevant to the business
32) Derek de Solla Price, Little Science, Big Science, New York: Columbia UP, 1963
33) Kim and Nelson, Op Cit, 2000.
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system. They typically survive on a mixture of core state funding and contract work for
industry. They are rarely ‘intermediaries,’ in the sense of brokering knowledge produced
in science. Rather, they work within and help develop knowledges within applied
paradigms. Intellectually, they live their own lives, in the good cases in close
collaboration with industrial customers. Traditionally, the intermediary institutions
provide a large share of their services as extra-mural R&D for medium-large companies.
Increasingly, governments are paying them also to work with smaller companies,
typically in a way, which includes an element of subsidy. 
3.5 Linkages in the NIS
It is not just the actors in the ‘boxes’ in Exhibit 4 that need to perform well, however. The
linkages among the boxes (and between actors within each box) are also very important
– not least those between the business system and the other research-performing sectors. 
If information were the only result of basic science, then there would be no incentive
for individual governments to fund it. Instead, they could act as ‘free riders’: using the
information published as a result of other countries’ investments in science, rather than
themselves contributing to the costs of science. This free-rider behaviour would be
contained if the time from scientific discovery to market exploitation were an important
factor in competition. This seems to be the case in parts of molecular biology and
pharmaceuticals. But there need to be other benefits from funding science if individual
states are to be dissuaded from free riding. 
Pavitt points out that “Contrary to common belief, the main economic benefits of basic
research are not knowledge directly applicable in a narrow range of sectors, but background
knowledge, research skills, instruments and methods that yield economic benefits over a
much broader range of sectors.”34 Valorising this background knowledge and skills
therefore requires extensive contact – networking in today’s jargon – between basic
researchers and others. It can not be achieved by putting basic research in an Ivory
Tower. Equally, industry cannot make use of basic science if it lacks the capabilities to
handle these types of resources. 
Case studies and surveys provide an interesting – but essentially unquantified – list of
economic benefits resulting from basic research: 
• New, useful information
• New instrumentation and methodologies
• Skills, especially skilled graduates
• Access to networks of experts and information
• Solving complex technological problems
• ‘Spin-off ’ companies.35
34) Keith Pavitt, ‘The national usefulness of the research base,’ paper presented to the Advisory Board of
the Research Councils, Brighton: SPRU, 16 April 1991.
35) for an excellent review, see Ben Martin, Ammon Salter et al, The Relationship Between Publicly.
Funded Basic Research and Economic Performance, report to HM Treasury, Brighton: Science Policy
Research Unit, 1996.
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The research literature in this area, however, comes almost entirely from large OECD
countries, notably the USA. Our evaluation of the Basic Research Grants Scheme in 
Ireland36 identified a seventh link: sharing access to specialised equipment and informal
trading in samples and consumables. We largely validated Martin and Salter’s findings
for the case of Irish universities, at a point where Ireland had clearly moved from NIC
to OECD income levels. However, it is not clear from the literature how many of these
links operate at earlier stages of development or how effective they are at those points. 
In so far as intermediary organisations are easier for companies to deal with, their links
with the business system tend to be wider than the links of the university scientists.
Their out-reach in OECD countries can be very good among companies which lack the
technological capability to deal with science. Equally, in the absence of incentives for
them actively to reach out to and serve the business system, they readily prioritise
internal over external goals. There are many examples of well-functioning Research and
Technology Organisations (RTOs) in both developed and developing countries, which
help develop both the knowledge-using and knowledge-creating capabilities of their
industrial clientele. They may serve as ‘knowledge gatekeepers’ for a cluster of firms, in
addition to providing more direct services.37 As one example among many, CITER in
the textile district of Carpi, Italy brings the cluster both access to new technologies such
as computer-aided design and cutting but also intelligence about fashion trends and
business process improvements.38 The potential importance of RTOs in development
depends partly on industrial structure. Thus, in the context of Taiwan’s and Hong
Kong’s SME-dominated economies, RTOs appear to have paid a useful role in support
of company development, while in the context of Korea’s development focus on the
major Chaebol, RTOs have been less significant and the development of company-
internal capabilities have been more important.39
The critical requirements for such RTOs to be successful appear to be a degree of
receptiveness and minimum capability on the part of firms, and RTO management
highly attuned to the needs of the customers. A fascination with research per se is a
recurrent factor among RTOs, but one that tends to promote failure in the industrial
mission.40
More generally, it is clear that, while the levels of capability and absorptive capacity
needed may vary among the components shown in Exhibit 4, it is clear that few (if any)
can operate in the absence of such capacities. The Stockholm Technology Bridge
Foundation, which has a mission to promote links between the Universities in the City
and other socio-economic actors, especially firms, points out that a bridge needs a
foundation at each end. It works, therefore, both to develop companies’ absorptive
capacity and to encourage change in the culture and incentive systems of the universities
themselves, in order to create reasons for the academics to work with the outside world. 
36) Erik Arnold and Ben Thuriaux, The Basic Research Grants Scheme: An Evaluation, Dublin: 
Forfás, 1998.
37) Bell and Albu, Op Cit.
38) Howard Rush, Michael Hobday, John Bessant, Erik Arnold and Robin Murray, Technology Institutes:
Strategies for Best Practice, London: International Thomson Business Press, 1996.
39) Ibid; Kim and Nelson, Op Cit.
40) Rush et al, Op Cit.
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4. Research, Innovation and Catching Up
The experience of various newly industrialising countries in catching up towards OECD
levels of income and development provides useful clues about development needs and
tactics. This section aims to capture some of this experience and to relate it to the wider
problem of funding development. Since the experience considered is of industrialisation,
it is strongly coloured by the needs of industrial firms. In so far as the agricultural and
health care sectors – like firms – are predominantly technology-using, industrial experience
should also have relevance for them.41 
Post-war thinking on research for development has polarised around two views.42 One
was that which gave rise to the ‘technology gap’ approach: namely, the idea that the
technology stock of the developed world could simply be transferred to developing
countries. This overlooked the reality that some of this technology was skill- and
capital-intensive, complex and inappropriate to factor prices and availabilities outside the
developed world. It also completely missed the point that an active R&D or innovation
function is a necessity for absorbing and developing externally generated technology. 
The alternative view was that developing countries needed autonomously to develop
their own science and technology ‘base’ more or less from scratch. This was partly to
avoid dependence on the developed world, and therefore to avoid a kind of neo-
colonialism. It was often also seen as a necessary complement to import-substituting
industrialisation policies – bolstered by the linear-model idea that research would
necessarily lead to innovation. This view was also partly a reaction to colonial history. In
many countries colonialists had encouraged the development only of the new
knowledge needed for colonial exploitation, such as specific medical, climatic and
agricultural knowledge. Colonialists varied in the extent to which the needed
knowledges were generated in the colonies or at home, but had generally little interest
in fostering more complete research systems in the colonies.43
4.1 The Catching Up Process
Especially since 1950, there has been a clear pattern of convergence among the
developed economies in total factor productivity and in labour productivity.44 This is
generally ascribed to their ability to operate at or near the scientific and technological 
41) A caveat is that, to the extent that these sectors deal with unique local problems, the opportunities for
creative-imitation-based strategies may be more limited.
42) Howard Pack, ‘Research and development in the industrial development process,’ in Linsu Kim and
Richard R Nelson (eds), Technology, Learning and Innovation: Experiences of Newly Industrialising
Countries, Cambridge University Press, 2000.
43) For a series of accounts of the development and functioning of scientific communities, see Jacques
Gaillard, V V Krishna and Roland Waast (eds), Scientific Communities in the Developing World,
New Dehli: Sage Publications, 1997.
44) E. Woolf, ‘Technology, capital accumulation and long-run growth,’ in J Fagerberg, B Verspagen and
N von Tunzelmann (eds), The Dynamics of Technology, Trade and Growth, Aldershot: Edward Elgar:
1994.
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frontier. There is more to this than R&D, because these economies’ spend on R&D/GDP
varies by two or so percentage points. But there is a huge gap in both absolute and
relative spending on R&D between these countries and developing nations, as well as in
factor productivity and per capita incomes. Closing this gap is not a passive process.45
Among other things, this depends on the rate of investment in R&D activities by the
follower countries.46
The Industrial Revolution in England, which started in the late Eighteenth Century,
was not based on science but on the development of pragmatic engineering capabilities,
with science later on filling in and formalising gaps in knowledge.47 Not until the late
Nineteenth Century did science-based industry (chemicals and to some degree the
electrical sector) play a major role in the economy. Catching up today similarly depends
more on developing and deploying technological capabilities in the business system than
on formal research. Since the required technological trajectories have already been
identified through the activities of ‘leader’ firms and nations, a major part of the catch-
up effort needs to be devoted to creative imitation. 
Until the late 1960s, there was little interest among development economists in the role
of research and technology in the development process. It was assumed that technology
was developed in the advanced countries and ‘transferred’ between countries in the form
of capital goods. In the neo-classical approach, technology transfers are assumed to be
smooth and costless – essentially because technology is not theorised in neo-classical
economics. Technology would therefore automatically be acquired in the course of
capital accumulation. Subsequently, a substantial literature has grown up which describes
the realities of technology transfer. It points out: the role of learning; the fact that any
particular technology embodies assumptions about the environment in which it will be
used; and shows that considerable innovative activity is required in order to make use of
transferred technology. The sharp distinction between invention and imitation assumed
in the neo-classical approach is, in fact, an illusion. The imitation process involves a great
deal of innovation – in the sense of implementing products and processes which are new
to the firm – and this, in turn, requires a industrial skill set very similar to that for
invention.48 
Starting with the neo-classical idea of simple technology transfer, a separate tradition of
‘technology gap’ analysis has arisen to investigate the differences between ‘leader’ and
‘follower’ nations. The idea is that in leader economies the growth of output depends on
the rate at which the scientific/technological frontier moves. In follower economies, it is
determined by the speed at which they adopt and adapt technologies developed by the
leaders. In this tradition, too, the complexity of technology transfer has increasingly
been understood and the roles of learning and R&D investigated. 
Catching up is, in important respects, easier than moving ahead of other developed
nations. In the catching up process, the ‘gap’ with the state of technology in leader
countries helps define the capabilities that are needed and the directions in which 
45) Bell & Albu, Op Cit.
46) Jan Fagerberg, ‘A technology-gap approach to why growth rates differ,’ in Christopher Freeman (ed)
Output Measurement in Science and Technology, Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1987.
47) David Landes, The Unbound Prometheus: Technological Change and Industrial Development in
Western Europe, Cambridge University Press, 1969.
48) Arnold and Thuriaux, Op Cit, 1997; Bell & Albu, Op Cit.
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resources should be allocated. Successful strategies for closing the gap have focused on
creating technological capabilities in industry. The approach taken in the SE Asian
‘Tiger’ economies in the 1960s and 1970s was to combine massive capital investment
with deliberate ‘reverse engineering’ and experimentation in selected branches of industry.
While the research and education systems were important producers of qualified
personnel, they do not appear to have played a direct role in industrial development.49
The Mercosur countries provide a stark contrast. While they also made significant
investments in foreign technology during the same period as the ‘Tigers,’ a similar
investment in using R&D for learning was not made, and the contribution made by
foreign technology to development was correspondingly lower.50
Since the development of technological capabilities during catch-up is a learning
process, we would expect there to be stages or levels of learning. For example, Schnarr51
has proposed a staged description of imitative product development at the firm level:
• Duplicative imitations, of two kinds:
- Counterfeits – illegal copies branded as the original products
- Knockoffs – (generally) legal copies which make no pretence of being the original,
but which sell under their own brands at lower prices
• Design copies – mimic the style of the brand leader, but introduce unique
engineering specifications
• Creative adaptations – are inspired by existing products, but differ from them
• Technological leapfrogging – where a latecomer uses more recent or more appropriate
technology to improve on the original product concept
• Adaptation to another industry – where technology from one branch is reapplied in
another.
The interest of Schnaar’s description is that it focuses on the use of existing products
and processes as a ‘school’ in building up technological and business capabilities. The
firm’s internal development and design capabilities grow as it moves between successive
stages, but there is no role for research. On the basis of the East Asian experience, at
least, successful firms may go through a kind of ‘reverse product cycle.52’ They begin
with simple assembly processes but gradually and systematically accumulate the
capability to modify, design and build their own product and process technologies.
Customers play a major part in this cycle, which proceeds through successively higher
value-added forms of production. 
At the national level, Nelson and Pack have argued that the success of the ‘Tiger’
economies53 was the outcome of several inter-related features, including:
• Their openness to foreign knowledge and their ability and willingness to tap
international markets
49) Kim & Nelson, Op Cit, 2000.
50) José Eduardo Cassiolato and Helene Maria Martins Lastres, ‘Local systems of innovation in Mercosur
countries,’ Industry and Innovation, Vol 7 No 1, 2000, pp. 33-53.
51) Stephen P. Schnaar, Managing imitation strategy: How later entrants seize markets from pioneers,
New York: Free Press, 1994.
52) Michael G Hobday, ‘Export-led technology development in the four Dragons: the case of electronics,’
Development and Change, Vol 25 No 2, 1994.
53) Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan.
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• The pressures brought to bear on firms to increase their productivity to continue to
increase exports rather than to use the knowledge obtained to extract rents from the
domestic economy, thus creating a demand for foreign technology
• The high productivity of foreign technology as its dissemination and successful use
were enhanced by an educated domestic labour force.54
Pack55 describes two stages in the development of the ‘Tigers.’ In the first stage of ‘early
industrial development,’ they focused on exporting labour-intensive products, under
intense national and international competitive pressure and using imported production
technology. There was a strong policy focus on providing universal primary education,
allowing these technology inflows and the use of the technology acquired. There was
limited interest in educating high-level research or R&D staff. At this stage, the
probability of domestic R&D producing viable innovations was very low. 
The second stage of ‘more complex industrial development’ involved building a more
advanced local education and skills base in order to enable learning and to allow local
evolution of foreign technology. Technical changes and innovations continued, however,
to be generated firmly within companies. Universities and the large RTOs such as ITRI
continued to contribute few product and process innovations. However, they did play
increasingly important roles as educators of qualified manpower. 
An important omission from the available accounts of catch-up development is the
creation and role of ‘mid-level’ craft and technician skills, which are crucial to the
absorption and use of production technologies and to a great deal of innovative activity
not classed as formal R&D. A further key omission concerns the need to develop design
capabilities.56 
During the catch-up process, then, research plays a limited role. Major, unfocused
investment in the basic research and scientific system risks creating capabilities
disconnected from the economy and society, which are unlikely to have developed the
absorptive capacity to make use of such investments. Given the limited resources available
for research, they also risk being below critical mass unless they are highly focused.
Investments in research institutions do not produce returns in the form of innovations,
but may be useful sources of the technology-literate people needed by the business system.
Given the long lead times involved in creating sustainable research communities, the
rate at which it makes sense to invest in national research (as opposed to broader R&D)
capabilities is a matter of delicate balance. It is very easy to over-invest, in anticipation
of an industrial demand for linkage which then fails to materialise. 
Once at the scientific/technological frontier, the way forward is no longer so clear. Huge
amounts of effort are devoted to R&D in the developed economies, and a very large
proportion of this is ‘wasted’ – in the sense that it does not result in a commercialised
product or process innovation. Well over half of all R&D projects in leading US 
54) Richard R Nelson and Howard Pack, ‘The Asian growth miracle and modern growth theory,’ 
The Economic Journal, Vol 109, 1999, pp 46-436.
55) Howard Pack, ‘Research and development in the industrial development process,’ in Kim and Nelson,
Op Cit.
56) Bell & Albu, Op Cit; Wield, Op Cit.
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technology-based companies are cancelled.57 Of completed innovation activities, very few
are highly profitable. Modern product life cycle theory builds on the idea of competing
attempts to define a ‘dominant design’58 or ‘product recipe’59 early in the life of a new
product. Inherently, the effort devoted to failed designs is ‘wasted,’ even if the overall
process is immensely powerful. In contrast with this searching and experimentation, the
targets for ‘catching up’ are relatively clear because much of the searching and
experimentation have already been done by others. 
While it is clear that there is scope for widely different national patterns of resource
allocation to R&D (based, in no small part, on the differences in industrial structure
among the ‘leader’ nations), catching up involves a structural change in the importance
of R&D. This change needs first to take place in the business system, with R&D
functions operating as organisations’ ‘learning department’. The extent to which the state
can act as midwife in this process depends somewhat on the industrial structure. RTOs
and extension services can be important where the structure is fragmented. However,
the nature of the R&D function changes as countries catch up. 
Research is critical both to advancing the technological frontier in fields dependent on formal
research, like biotechnology and semiconductors, and as one of technology’s ‘well springs’.
However … research tends to be much less firm-specific than product development, and
proprietary innovation within the firm may well depend on knowledge added to the pool
through research elsewhere. This points to a limited role for research in technology followers.
… One might conclude that technology followers should not do R&D. There are, however,
at least four reasons why followers should do R&D. First, formal R&D effort can usefully
complement process thrown-back-from-the-work innovation. Second, R&D teams can play a
crucial role as the firm’s ‘learners’ of knowledge produced elsewhere. Third, doing R&D can
have intangible spin-off benefits for the rest of the organisation. Fourth … moving up the
value chain to more attractive markets depends on a firm’s ability to develop proprietary
product designs.60
There is also an emerging pattern among rapidly-industrialising OECD countries61)
moving to the technology frontier, where national priorities for research funding shift to
become more inclusive of strategic and basic research. Norway and Finland, for
example, are resource-based economies, which have in the past focused heavily on
applied and industrial research funding, often via massive (compared with the size of
these small countries) RTOs such as SINTEF and VTT. Having reached the technology
frontier in key industries ranging from petroleum extraction through industrialised 
57) D Leonard-Barton and J Doyle, ‘Commercialising technology: Imaginative understanding of user
needs,’ in R Rosenbloom and W Spencer (eds), Engines of Innovation: US Industrial Research at the
End of an Era, Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1996.
58) William J Abernathy and James M Utterback, ‘Patterns of industrial innovation,’ Technology
Review, No 80, 1978.
59) Erik Arnold, Competition and Technological Change in the Television Industry, London: Macmillan,
1986.
60) N Forbes and D Wield, ‘Managing R&D in technology followers,’ Research Policy, Vol 29, No 9,
2000, pp. 1095-1110.
61) It should be recalled that among the countries discussed here, Norway, Finland and Ireland were
among the most impoverished in Europe before the Second World War, with very low absolute levels
of income.
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primary production (eg aquaculture) to electronics, raising the overall spend on R&D
assumes national priority. Norway is currently aiming to match the OECD’s average
investment of R&D/GDP, while Finland is even more aggressively aiming to spend 3
per cent of GDP on R&D. Basic science is an important beneficiary in both cases, even
if the bulk of the increase is expected to come from the business system. 
Ireland has recently gone through a dramatic policy change. ‘National Science
Foundation’-style funding for basic research and postgraduate training had been running
at well under £I 5m (Euro 6.5m) until the end of the decade. Then, the government
decided to invest £I 2.2 billion over 5 years in a massive upgrade to the university
research infrastructure and the pursuit of strategic research in IT and biotechnology.
Japan went through a rhetorically similar period in the early 1980s, when both
government and industry increased investments in basic (generally strategic) research. 
None of these policy transformations is total. Countries whose development has been
shaped by imitation, catch-up and applied R&D do not change their entire pattern of
expenditure overnight. However, the fact that the deliberate shift towards a higher basic
or strategic research content in state funding takes place as these countries establish
themselves firmly among the developed nations supports the idea that it is at the stage
of reaching the technology frontier that such investment makes most sense. 
4.2 Skills, Brain Drain and the Diaspora
The pattern of tertiary education across countries partly reflects national judgements
about the needed balance of effort among disciplines, and confirms this impression of a
shift towards the sciences at a comparatively late stage of development. Exhibit 6 shows
data assembled by Sanjaya Lall about the proportions of the population studying natural
sciences and engineering in selected countries. There are three clear patterns visible. It is
striking that while the OECD countries and the Tigers have similar proportions62 of
their population in technical tertiary education. The OECD countries put a comparatively
high degree of effort into the natural sciences and less into engineering. This is the
pattern we would expect to see in countries operating at or near the science/technology
frontier in many branches. In contrast, the Tigers’ educational efforts focus strongly on
engineering. Despite talk of reorientation towards basic science in Japan, the
educational pattern remains more similar to the Tigers than to the OECD. The Chinese
pattern is similar to that of the Tigers, but with a lower proportion of the population
participating in tertiary science and engineering education. (Obviously, in absolute
terms, the Chinese educational effort in these areas is nonetheless massive.) Thailand
follows the OECD pattern but at lower scale, while India has a unique focus on natural
sciences. Important institutional distortions lead to these misallocations of resources and
help impede both the effective use of personnel and reforms to shift the national efforts
towards engineering. The other countries’ overall efforts are modest. 
62) Note that there is a systematic bias here. OECD countries have ageing populations, so dividing
students by population tends to understate the absolute scale of the OECD effort.
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Exhibit 6
Proportions of Populations in Tertiary Science and Engineering Education 1994/5
Source: Reworking of data presented by Sanjaya Lall, ‘Technological change and industrialisation,’ in
Kim and Nelson, Op Cit, 2000. The original data come from UNESCO Statistical Yearbook 1995, Taiwan
Statistical Yearbook 1994, and the Ministry of Education in Singapore.
Since the 1960s, there has been concern about ‘brain drain,’ in the sense of a one-way
flow of scientific and professional talent from the South to the North, but also within
the North – especially towards the USA. This appears to comprise several elements
• Some degree of economic migration
• A confusion, where a movement of students and post-doctoral researchers to the
North is interpreted as an intention to emigrate permanently
• ‘Delayed return’ – as, in recent years, has been the case with a large number of
Chinese who were abroad as students during the Tienanmen Square incident, and
who do not want to return home until there is a change of government
• ‘Overflow,’ where there is an over-supply of scientific or professional people
compared with the ability of the home economy to absorb them.63
63) an early discussion, see G B Baldwin, ‘Brain drain or overflow?’ Foreign Affairs, Vol 48, No 2,
1970, pp. 358-372.
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A mid-1970s study of 6 500 students in 11 countries showed that:
• Students who stayed in their country of study on completion of their courses
nonetheless intended to return to their home country
• Most of the students who had returned to their home country intended to stay there
• It was not necessarily the brightest students who stayed in the country of study64
Of course, the longer people stay abroad, the greater is the tendency for them to get
‘stuck’ in their new location, but it does appear that the 1960s concern about brain
drain was over-blown. International mobility is increasingly understood as a normal
part of scientific activity, and is actively fostered within the European Union by
European Commission subsidies, in an effort to strengthen international research links.
In the development context, the International Organisation for Migration and the
UNDP, through its TOKTEN programme, have been fostering the return of trained
migrants to their home countries. 
South Korea and Taiwan had policies for the systematic reintegration of returning
migrants from the 1960s onwards. In the case of Korea, it was not until the 1980s that
large numbers of US-based Korean scientists and engineers decided to return home. By
that time, the level of development and job opportunity in Korea was already making
the country more attractive, and the government abandoned its programmes to attract
returning migrants in the 1990s, in the belief that the country had by that time become
sufficiently attractive for return to be spontaneous. 
Especially since the growth of the Internet, a growing number of national scientific and
professional diaspora have been organising – sometimes with the aid of resources form the
home country. These do not always aim to encourage repatriation, but they do provide
receptive international milieux, within which a circulation of students and post-docs
can take place, and through which the interaction between national and international
science can be fostered. However, both the high Korean return rate and the very low
return rates experienced in India lead to the same conclusion. Migrants return when
there are opportunities and when it becomes attractive to do so. In the case of research
personnel, this largely depends on the state of development of the NIS. 
4.3 The Multinationals
Many developing countries – and especially those historically concerned about
‘dependence’ – are rightly cautious in their dealings with multinational companies
(MNCs). Policy with respect to inward MNC investment in industry is seen as having
two related, though distinct, components. One is concerned with the initial investment
in production activities. The other is concerned with the extent and ‘depth’ of associated
technology development activities during the subsequent lifetime of the production facility. 
64) W A Glaser and G C Habers, The Brain Drain: Emigration and Return, UNITAR Research Report,
Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1978; cited from Jacques Gaillard and Anne Marie Gaillard, 
‘The international mobility of brains: exodus or circulation?’ Science, Technology and Society Vol 2,
No 2, 1997, pp. 195-228.
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While there may be initial signs of a trend to seek R&D manpower globally, most of
the evidence points to a ‘Triadisation’ rather than globalisation of multinationals’ R&D 
efforts.65 Studies of Multinational R&D location consistently point to the choice of
locations where there already is a strongly-developed NIS, which provides a rich
environment of geographically local network interactions to the company. MNC plant
which benefit from such an environment and conduct R&D are less ‘footloose’ than 
those which do not do R&D. In the Irish case, at least, it has been shown that the
greater the technology-intensity of the plant, the lower the probability that it will be
closed.66
Some major international companies also locate a handful of R&D outposts on or near
research campuses. The main driver is the presence of globally leading, excellent scientific
research. Few are in a position to offer such presence, so this type of R&D relationship
with multinationals is both rare and rather focused in the most advanced countries. 
Nonetheless, adaptation R&D and R&D/technical support are needed at plant level.
These provide important ways to ‘embed’ footloose foreign investment and strengthen
the hand of local MNC managers in global intra-firm competition for resources and
tasks. In Ireland, the research infrastructure has been able to provide some such support
to local managers, as well as to use the MNCs as ‘training schools’, enabling it to
increase the quality and relevance of national industrial extension services.67 The MNCs
act as demanding buyers, raising levels of quality and innovation among their local
suppliers. In the Irish case, again, the presence of a number of foreign electronics
multinationals has fostered the development of a large number of niche electronics and
software suppliers, and the growth of a significant indigenous software, electronics and
telecommunications sector. 
The flow of knowledge embodied in people moving between firms also seems to be very
important. In industrialising countries, subsidiaries and joint-venture partners of MNCs
often seem to play a particularly important role in generating such flows. For instance, a
1987 study in Taiwan examined the role of former MNC employees in a sample of 161
firms. It found that these ex-MNC personnel had made significant contributions to
strengthening management, product design and marketing capabilities. Some 96% of
the surveyed firms considered this was so with respect to managerial technology; 85%
with respect to the improvement of product design; and 76% with respect to marketing
65) Keith Pavitt and Pari Patel, ‘Global corporations and national systems ofinnovation: Who dominates
whom?’ in D Archibugi, J Howells and J Michie (eds) Innovation Systems in a Global Economy,
Cambridge University Press, 1998; Brechje Albert, Paul Beije, Patries Boekholt, Maureen
Lankhuizen and Rob van Tulder, Interactive Innovation: Multinationals and Systems of Innovation
– Towards an Internatiuonal Interactive Perspective, report to EU TSER Programme, Erasmus
University, October 2000.
66) Allan Kearns and Frances Ruane, ‘The tangible contribution of R&D-spending foreign-owned plants
to a host region: a plant-level study of the Irish manufacturing sector (1980-1996),’ Research Policy,
Vol 30, 2001, pp. 227-244.
67) Erik Arnold and Ken Guy, AMT Ireland: A Mid-term Evaluation, Dublin: Forfás, 1993; 
Erik Arnold and Norman Waterman, Materials Ireland: An Evaluation, Dublin, Forfás, 1994.
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technology.68 More recently in the Malaysian electronics industry, flows of people who
had acquired product design and process engineering experience in MNCs appear to
have contributed important knowledge inputs to the development of technology in
supplier and other firms.69
Multinationals, then, are very important sources of learning and can be helpful motors
of development. Successful policies involve strategies to embed MNCs within the local
economy, and to support their local efforts to raise their technological level as far as
possible – not least because in doing so they will drag local suppliers with them. It is
important to recognise that MNCs, like other companies, are in business for money and
behave accordingly. But we find that the desire in some places to foster development
autonomously from the MNCs involves missing important opportunities and is
ultimately counter-productive. On the contrary, there are opportunities to integrate the
multinationals better into development strategy. 
4.4 Aid Funding of Research
Donors increasingly see research funding as an important component of overall
development aid, aiming both to build research capabilities in developing countries and
to produce needed knowledge. However, much funding has been channelled into
building scientific capabilities, as opposed to those needed for catching up, and –
despite the best of intentions – this has turned out to hinder, not to help, development.
The research funding pattern needs to be adapted to reflect the R&D and innovation
needs of the recipient National Innovation System. These needs are likely to vary from
field to field, depending on distance from the science/technology frontier, and from
country to country. Money needs to be invested more widely across the innovation
system in order to meet these needs, and to be used not only in public sector research
institutions but also in RTOs and in the business system, including private companies. 
A striking feature of research communities in many poorer developing countries is how
small they are, in absolute terms, and therefore how fragile. Research communities that
may take many years to establish are easy to destroy.70 Often lacking critical mass, with
poor links to global scientific networks and being at a disadvantage in publishing in the
‘high impact’ (predominantly English-language) international journals, many
developing country research communities face an uphill struggle. Normal aspects of
group behaviour in the interpersonal networks that make up the ‘invisible colleges’ of
global science militate against newcomers and outsiders, making it hard for developing
country researchers to break into the ‘charmed circle’ of those who dominate the
invisible colleges. Publication and citation practices and the routines of those who
generate bibliometric databases militate against the inclusion and recognition of
68) C-M Hou and S Gee, ‘National systems supporting technical advance in industry: the case of
Taiwan,’ in R R Nelson (ed), National Innovation Systems: A Comparative Analysis, 
Oxfod University Press, 1993.
69) Results from an ongoing SPRU DPhil study by Norlela Ariffin.
70) For examples including Algeria, Kenya and Senegal, see Jacques Gaillard, V V Krishna and 
Roland Waast, Scientific Communities in the developing World, NewDelhi: Sage Publications, 1997.
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developing country contributions to the growth of knowledge.71 These factors may be
compounded by genuine problems of quality. It is difficult for small, isolated, under-
funded research groups to work at the leading edge of research, precisely because science
is a social activity72) – and a global activity, at that. 
Often, it is difficult to make research a ‘policy subject’ in the South.73 Science as a
practice may conflict with aspects of established value systems, and its promotion by
donors can even be considered as a form of cultural imperialism. It can be difficult for
developing country governments to see the value in prioritising research activities whose
benefits are uncertain and hard to visualise, especially in the context of other pressing,
short-term needs. There is therefore a tendency for developing country research systems
to become locked into historical patterns, such as research relating to the production of 
existing agricultural commodities and/or the priorities of former colonialists. As a result,
they may be locked out of newer and more economically promising areas.74
As part of the post-War enthusiasm for science, a burst of development enthusiasm in the
1960s included an initial belief that the stock of technological knowledge in the more
industrially advanced countries could easily be transferred to developing countries. Thus,
the 1963 UN conference on the Application of Science and Technology for Development
was organised to ‘display’ the technological wares of the North and Southern countries
were urged to ‘shop wisely’. There was some discussion at that conference about establishing
local S&T capabilities in the South, but the main emphasis was on knowledge transfer. It
was therefore seen as unproblematic that much research for development was carried out
in the developed countries, rather than the developing world. Examples of institutions
involved include the Tropical Products Research Institute and the Anti Locust Research
Centre in the UK, with most of the research undertaken by British scientists in British
institutions. The 1970 World Plan of Action on Science and Technology for Development,
prepared by the UN Advisory Committee on Science and Technology (ACAST)
suggested that 5 per cent of R&D expenditures in the rich countries should be focused on
problems of the poorer nations. (Unsurprisingly, the suggestion has not been taken up.)75
Canada founded IDRC in 1970, and Sweden followed with SAREC (now the research
division of SIDA) shortly afterwards. These, and a number of subsequent funding
initiatives, responded to a growing perception of need for research ‘capacity development’
within developing countries. In many cases, however, the types of capacity which donors
have sought to build have been unhelpful. There was emphasis in the 1960s and 1970s
on trying to establish ‘world class’ research institutions in the developing world. Much
donor effort was oriented towards science, rather than towards its application. There was
a tendency to try to ‘seed’ new initiatives rather than to fund them over long periods of 
time. There was often greater interest in funding individuals than institutions. This
frequently involved the individuals undertaking research training and research in the
North, reinforcing the tendency to ‘brain drain’ among developing country researchers.
At the time, these tendencies were seen as unproblematic – not least because they were
71) Jean-Jacques Salomon, Francisco R Sagasti and Céline Sachs-Jeantet eds, The Uncertain Quest:
Science, Technology and Development, New York: United Nations University Press, 1994; 
W Wayt Gibbs, ‘Lost science in the Third World,’ Scientific American, August 1995.
72) T S Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd edn. University of Chicago Press, 1970.
73) Arocena and Stutz, Op Cit, 2000.
74) Enos, 1995.
75) This account of events is based on a personal communication from Geoffrey Oldham.
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consistent with the ‘linear model.’ But the results of these funding investments have
generally been very disappointing. 
Thus, Enos’ analysis of structural adjustment programmes and scientific research in 
sub-Saharan Africa led him to paint a depressing picture:
• Under Structural Adjustment Programmes, domestic expenditures on advancing
science and technology fluctuate from year to year, with a slight upward trend
• Total expenditures, counting both local and foreign, are likely to rise at a
considerably higher rate
• Within the total, different areas of endeavour have considerably varying fortunes
• Which areas prosper, and which do not, are increasingly determined by foreigners …
• The choice of areas to be pursued is currently based upon the benefits of such choice
for the developed countries, to the detriment of the developing countries.76
Since they do not want for ever to be locked into individual commitments, donors tend
to be attracted to funding one-time costs, such as investments. They are reluctant to pay
for wages, equipment maintenance and renewal or consumables, yet without these the
research enterprise cannot function.77 Donor interventions can therefore result in the
creation of research communities or institutions that are not only irrelevant to recipients
but also unsustainable over time. 
Donors now tend to fund research for two reasons:
• To support research-capacity building in developing countries 
(the capacity objective)
• To support research with the purpose of producing results relevant for developing
countries (the results objective).
Donors naturally feel most confidence is supporting public sector R&D. In so far as the
‘right’ level of public and private R&D investment are interdependent, this risks
pushing the national innovation system out of balance, unless there are complementary
mechanisms leading to increases in private-sector R&D. If the linear model were
correct, of course, the increased science would lead to increased activity in the business
systems. In an innovation systems world, however, increased science funding on its own
leads only to an increase in science. Excess funding to educate researchers who cannot
be absorbed into the National Innovation System also encourages ‘brain drain.’ 
There are arguments for funding basic research for cultural and nation-building
purposes – for example, to help (re)build a national identity through studies in history
and anthropology. However, our analysis suggests there is limited direct economic value
76) J L Enos, In Pursuit of Science and Technology in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Impact of Structural
Adjustment Programmes, UNU/INTECH Studies in New Technology and Development, London:
RKP, 1995.
77) Jesper Carlsson and Lennart Wohlgemuth, Capacity Building and Networking: A meta-evaluation
of African regional research networks, Department for Evaluation and Internal Audit, 96/45
Stockholm: Sida, 1966.
78) See Erik Arnold and Ben Thuriaux, Developing Firms’ Technological Capabilities, report to OECD,
Brighton: Technopolis, 1997. This may be downloaded from www.technopolis-group.com.
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to be gained by many developing countries from major investment in basic research. In
certain fields, it is likely that individual developing countries are – and need to be –
close to the science/technology frontier. Such fields probably cluster in agriculture and
health care, where problems may be specific to a country or a region. In these cases,
there are few opportunities to learn from others, and there are good reasons for donors
to fund scientific research, in addition to supporting the application of knowledge. In
most cases, however, the biggest development effects are likely to come from various
forms of ‘creative imitation.’ As we have shown in previous sections of this paper, for
‘creative imitation’ to have an effect, it must take place primarily in the business system
– sometimes with the support of RTOs. 
OECD countries also have a need to foster ‘creative imitation’ and capability building
among SMEs and others such as small farmers, whose capabilities lag both the
science/technology frontier and many aspects of best practice. They therefore have a vast
repertoire of programmes to address these problems78 – primarily by encouraging and
subsidising capability creation within the private sector. Many of these programmes are
expensive to run and are designed to operate within rich innovation systems and
infrastructures. As with technology, they cannot always simply be copied and put
directly to good use. They do represent a significant stock of knowledge and experience, 
which can be exploited via ‘creative policy imitation.’ Doing so requires both the
willingness and the ability on the part of donors to work with a greater part of
recipients’ NIS. In some countries there will also be a need to overcome the vested
interests of the scientific élites fostered by earlier advice and through donations inspired
by the ‘linear model.’ 
78) See Erik Arnold and Ben Thuriaux, Developing Firms’ Technological Capabilities, report to OECD,
Brighton: Technopolis, 1997. This may be downloaded from www.technopolis-group.com.
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5. Policy and Funding Implications
In this final section, we discuss innovation policy trends and the considerable
innovation policy repertoire of the OECD countries, and draw conclusions from the
whole of the paper for funding research for development. We suggest both that a
significant Gestalt shift is needed in thinking about funding research for development,
and that this should in turn lead to significant increase in the proportion of resources
devoted to creative imitation in the business system. 
5.1 Policy Changes and Trends
The rate of innovation in R&D and innovation policy instruments in OECD countries
has been very high in recent years, resulting in a rich flora of actions. These include:
• Building company capabilities. This involves a large range of supports including
training in management and marketing, help in preparing for quality certification,
technology and business audits to identify improvement opportunities
• Typically, OECD systems also provide advisory support – and sometimes finance –
to start-up firms, especially where these are technology based. Many countries have
adopted schemes to subsidise the recruitment of a first engineer by companies,
aiming to set off a virtuous circle of technological learning. 
• Innovations in smaller firms are often eligible for support – either through grants or
through more or less soft loans. Support may also come in the form of a subsidy to
pay for external innovation help, for example from an industry research institute. 
• Network support includes programmes of supplier development, aiming to increase
the capabilities of local firms providing inputs to large buyers (such as
multinationals’ branch plant), partner search activities to find co-producers, sub-
contractors or distributors, as well as more general support to the creation of inter-
company networks. Once initiated, company networks in turn provide mutual
support to in a range of activities from purchasing through marketing to sharing
good practices and facilities. 
In the spirit of the NIS model, increasing effort has been devoted to inter-linking
different parts of the innovation system, and especially in building links to the research
system. Activities cover institutional linkage mechanisms, such as science parks and the
use of industrial liaison officers to define and exploit institutions’ intellectual property.
New linkage institutions, have been created such as the Swedish ‘Technology Bridge
Foundations,’ whose job is to foster the use of university resources and capabilities in
other parts of society. 
For the past 20 years or so, increased efforts have been put into encouraging the
research and business sectors to work together. This can be via collaborative R&D
schemes, ‘Competence centres’ or industrial centres of excellence where a consortium
from the business system located R&D activity within a university or research campus.
The long-established idea of Research Associations – where, typically, a branch-specific
user group ‘owns’ in some way an applied research institute – has been supplemented
with R&D networks, where a company networks work do R&D or technology transfer
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activities with a range of institutional suppliers. This introduces flexibility of supply, and
encourages research institutes to work in a user-focused way. 
Other kinds of measures to link demand with innovators have been developed. These
include developmental procurement, where the state provides an assured initial market
for innovations meeting its needs – for example, improved hospital equipment.
Variations of this principle involve identifying and connecting private demand with
potential innovative solutions.79 
A further strand of innovation support promotes mobility, exchanging industry and
research workers in order to provide them with insights into their external partners’
needs. In the European Union, a several thousand people per year receive funding to
spend periods in other EU states, for example to undertake post-doctoral research, in an
attempt to build European scientific communities. 
There have been various initiatives aiming to link research activity to the needs of the
demand side. At the aggregated level, this has involved national consultation exercises
such as Technology Foresight programmes. These aim to provide comparatively wide
consultation about the future priorities for R&D funding. Increased separation between
those who buy and those who perform state-funded R&D has in creased pressures for
clear specification of tasks and output measures. Other more specific measures have also
collectively had a rather significant effect on the customer orientation of the research
infrastructure. These include:
• Reduced funding and/or increased commercial earnings requirements for RTOs and
other state-funded research performers
• R&D tax credits
• Vouchers or ‘cheques’ to be used by firms in purchasing services form the research
sector or RTOs
• Redirection of money intended to pay for industrially relevant R&D away from the
research sectors and towards firms. In this way, companies in effect buy services from
the research sector, as opposed to being offered that which the researchers choose to
offer.
Cutting across all this diversity in innovation support measures are three broad common
features of policy development in recent years in many industrialised countries. 
Within the overall array of policy measures concerned with industrial technology
development, a very large part is concerned with supporting and facilitating action by
firms themselves. Measures to support technology institutions are an important
component of the policy system. But at least over the last ten years or so, a major
emphasis in policy development has been given to mechanisms that assist and empower
forms to make use of each other and those institutions, in order to support their own
technology development activities and to strengthen their own technological
79) Examples include the IFU programme in Norway and the Environment Technology Delegation in
Sweden. See Johan Hauknes, Marianne Broch og Keith Smith, SND og Bedrifsutvikling – Rolle,
Virkemidler og Effekter, Delrapport 1 i evaluering av Statens nærings- og distriktutviklingsfond
gjennomført av Technopolis Group, STEP og Albatross Consulting, Oslo: STEP, 2000.  Erik Arnold,
Andreas Wulff and Ken Guy, Miljötekdelegationen: An Evaluation, Stockholm:
Miljöteknikdelegationen, 1999.
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capabilities. In effect, policy development has focused heavily on mechanisms that will
strengthen demand-driven technology development systems, rather than continuing the
earlier often exclusive emphasis on supporting technology institutions within supply-
driven systems. 
Within that firm-centred approach to policy, increasing emphasis has been given to
stimulating and facilitating various forms of collective activity involving groups of firms.
These groups may be established industry association, but they may also be less formally
structured groups organised around (segments of ) value chains, and/or regional clusters
of firms in related industries.
A large and growing proportion of these firm-centred policy mechanisms have been
concerned with stimulating forms of technology development that draw primarily on
existing knowledge and practice. Obviously, very large volumes of public resources are
committed to supporting the development of new knowledge and original innovations
at the international frontier. However, over the last ten years or so greatly increased
emphasis has been given to measures that support firms in acquiring, using,
incrementally developing and applying existing knowledge and practices. 
The resurgence of a concern with the social control and the ‘relevance’ of science to
society, together with – in the 1990s – increasing efforts to implement a ‘new public
management’ driven by measurable objectives, has led to a battle for control of R&D.
In many OECD countries, this is manifest as a bureaucratic tussle between Ministries of
Education and Industry, in which the ‘relevance’ faction has slowly become dominant.
The past two or three years have seen a turning of the tide in several countries, with
changes in budgets and governance increasingly favouring a ‘neutral’ basic science. 
To the extent that this represents a resurgence of the linear model, we find this trend
disturbing. A policy, which focuses on basic science and ignores the innovation process,
will result in more science, not more wealth. To the extent that the resurgence of basic
research (and infrastructure) funding in some OECD countries may actually represent a
rebalancing to compensate for the pendulum having moved too far towards ‘relevance’
to maintain a stable R&D infrastructure, we are less concerned. But the ‘balance’ can
only be set at the national level – based on the specific structures and needs of the
individual economy and society. Different resource bases, problems, opportunities and
national levels of development imply that a single formula will not be appropriate in all
countries and at all times. 
That said, one relatively clear development trajectory available to some countries is to
focus heavily on applied research and intermediary institutions, before putting a more
serious effort into basic research. Ireland is a case in point (see Appendix). Japan and
Norway have arguably followed a similar strategy. In contrast, Thailand and Morocco
have historically built up the science base without paying much attention to linkage – 
as a result of which, industrial development is either largely autonomous of the national
R&D infrastructure or weak. The choice of strategy is closely linked to the governance
of research and research funding. To the extent that the scientific and technological elite
itself captures the mechanisms of governance, it is likely to fund its own activities rather
than to pay a great deal of attention to social and industrial needs, thereby isolating the
R&D infrastructure from the development process. 
5. Policy and Funding Implications
315
5.2 Conclusions and Recommendations for Funding Research 
for Development
Based on research and theory about the role of knowledge in economic development,
we draw a somewhat radical conclusion. While the creation and flow of new knowledge
traditionally has high status, attracts policy attention and funding, the working and
reworking of the stock of knowledge is much more important for economic
development. Since technological change and economic innovation drive the capitalist
economy, creative imitation is the central process in capitalist economic development. In
economic terms, science is much more significant as a source of trained people than as a
generator of new knowledge, inventions and innovations. 
This conclusion will be unpalatable to many. It runs directly counter to the career
structure, incentives and culture of the higher education and research sector, where the
creation of new knowledge is an over-riding value. It implies an end to the comparatively
‘hands off,’ project-based funding policies so far pursued by many donors in the area of
research for development, to be replaced by closer engagement with the innovation
system as a whole. And it suggests a need for both funders and national policy makers
to get to grips with R&D and innovation activities in the private sector, not just in
public institutions. 
While the ‘business system’ is the producer of growth, jobs and money in the National
Innovation System, its constituent organisations (firms, farms, hospitals, and so on)
have ‘bounded rationality.’ They develop by learning, and they learn in interaction with
each other and other parts of the National Innovation System. Helping to make sure
the National Innovation System works well is a legitimate function of the state. This
requires that research and innovation be on the ‘policy agenda’ and that the state takes a
view of its responsibilities, which goes beyond tackling traditional ‘market failure.’
Supporting the build-up and application of technological capabilities – including, but
not only, the ability to do R&D – in the business system is a key element. OECD
countries have a vast repertoire of policy instruments to build capabilities among their
smaller and less technologically capable firms. This provides an opportunity to use
creative imitation to exploit this knowledge base in a manner adapted to individual
developing country needs.
An important target is that the business system should grow quantitatively to dominate
the overall national R&D effort. While there is a need to invest in public-sector
education and research, their main functions are the supply of qualified people and, in
the case of Research and Technology Organisations, to act as gatekeepers and enablers
of the business system’s own innovation activities. As long as countries are ‘catching up’
and lag the science/technology frontier, the need for new knowledge from the national
research sector is limited because the technological trajectories to be followed are rather
clear. R&D is mostly about learning, rather than about creating new knowledge. Once
at the frontier, the links to a strengthened research sector and, especially, a significant
increase in intra-business system R&D become more important, and it is a rational to
spend much more on science and public research than is the case for ‘catch-up’
countries. 
With the aid of donor funding, it is all too easy to over-invest in research in the South.
This tends to be poorly linked to the business system and can promote an ‘overflow
brain drain.’ Management of the diaspora offers a prospect of encouraging well-
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qualified expatriates to return home once demand for their skills picks up and the
quality of the National Innovation System improves. 
Funding decisions need to be taken in the context of a systems view of the recipient
National Innovation System (NIS). Different countries’ systems have different needs. A
generic funding recipe will cause inappropriate investments, therefore time and money
are needed for mapping recipient NIS’s – and also for projects, such as Technology
Foresight, which identify problems, propose strategies and encourage self-activation. 
A national research policy is part of this picture, which may be a useful object for aid
aiming to secure development. 
The priorities of donor countries may not be the same as those of recipients.
Mechanisms are needed which help test needs, rather than relying on donor desires and
guesses. It can be worth considering placing investments at the level of national funding
institutions (eg a national science and technology agency) rather than at the project
level, in order to secure a fit with recipient needs. However, in a number of cases, this
will need to be accompanied by investments in administrative reform processes. 
In most countries, the most important part of the NIS for securing economic
development is private industry. Programmes, which increase capabilities/absorptive
capacity here, should have high priority, otherwise there will be no economic use for
investments in the R&D infrastructure. This may be difficult to live with in the context
of corruption prevalent in certain developing countries, and in the context of hardening
international rules on state aids, but the issue nonetheless has to be faced. 
Correspondingly, investments in developing countries which focus only on the research
infrastructure – especially that for basic science – may have some educational pay-off
(and that is important), but will otherwise have limited economic impact. Important
exceptions are cases where the national effort in R&D is already at or close to the
science/technology frontier. Typically, these cases involve tackling specific local problems
in health care or agriculture. Investments in research facilities and groups need to take
account of the needs for international linkages into the relevant global research
communities, and the ongoing costs of maintaining a research capability (for example,
in the maintenance and renewal of equipment, travel, etc). Quality standards in science
and technology are set at the world level. Investments unlikely to attain these standards
are a waste of money. 
While there is some increase in MNCs’ willingness to conduct R&D outside their
headquarters economies, these wider R&D locations continue to be mostly in the Triad
countries. MNCs will locate small R&D groups close to publicly funded research
groups – but only if these conduct excellent, world class research. The idea that an
R&D infrastructure investment will attract MNCs to a developing country is – in most
cases – naïve, and needs to be treated with appropriate caution.
We suspect that making use of these conclusions and recommendations will require
rather radical rethinking and reform of the role of donor agencies in research for
development. Without such rethinking, we anticipate that the development returns to
donor investment in research for development will continue to be poor. 
